When a § 924(c) conviction is predicated on a VICAR offense, must a reviewing court apply the categorical approach to the state or federal statute underpinning the VICAR offense to assess whether the underlying statute categorically requires the intentional or knowing use of violent force?

QUESTION PRESENTED Section 924(c) of Title 18, U.S. Code, which makes it a crime to carry a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” defines a crime of violence in two alternate clauses: the force clause under § 924(c)(8)(A) and the residual clause under § 924(c)(38)(B). In United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), this Court determined that the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness. Thus, the predicate offenses only remain valid crimes of violence if they fall under the force clause of § 924(c)(3)(A). In Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 429 (2021), this Court explained that a predicate offense satisfies the force clause of § 924(c) only if it requires the purposeful or knowing use of violent force. To make this determination, courts must apply the categorical approach. Here, the predicate offenses of Petitioner’s § 924(c) convictions were convictions under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, which makes it a crime to support a racketeering enterprise by committing an enumerated offense—including murder, maiming, and assault with a dangerous weapon—“in violation of the laws of any State or the United States.” § 1959(a). The Fourth Circuit, rather than applying the categorical approach to the specific statute underpinning the VICAR convictions, instead presumed that all VICAR offenses satisfy the force clause via the VICAR statute’s general requirement that the defendant had a racketeering purpose. The question presented is: When a § 924(c) conviction is predicated on a VICAR offense, must a reviewing court apply the categorical approach to the state or federal statute underpinning the VICAR offense to assess whether the underlying statute categorically requires the intentional or knowing use of violent force?! 1 This is effectively the same question presented in the petition for certiorari pending before this Court in Kinard v. United States, No. 24-5042, and is identical to the question presented by Mr. Roane’s co-defendant in Tipton v. United States, No. 245322. Mr. Roane respectfully requests that his petition be held for consideration concurrently with or after this Court resolves those matters. i STATEMENT OF