1. Did the Court create conflicts in the law by failing to be guided by the common-law rule, well-established public policy and the long legal tradition protecting an employee's, or any competent person's, decision to refuse any unwanted medical treatment?

2. Did the Court create conflicts in law, pursuant to recent Supreme Court authority, that compulsory treatment for the health benefit of the person treated—as opposed to compulsory treatment for the health benefit of others—implicates the fundamental right to refuse a medical treatment based on medical privacy and informed consent as echoed in the statute?

3. Did the Court err by failing to consider that an employer violates the ADA's prohibition on discriminatory qualification standards when it imposes a non-job-related medical treatment as a condition for employment, and then treats her adversely despite claiming ADA protection of her job, given the fact that the employee alleged that the medical treatment only claims to lessen symptoms for the user but does not claim to prevent infection of others, and the employee alleged that the employer regards any untreated employee as a "direct threat" to health and safety without first performing an individualized assessment as required?

4. Did the Court abuse its discretion by failing to consider the Congressional intent and standard of review for ADA pleadings by failing to review defendant's response to determine if it expressed any viable ADA defense?

5. Is a covered employer required by the ADA to show, particularly when challenged, that the new "COVID policy" qualification standards for employment are both job-related for the position in question and consistent with "business necessity" so that the new standards do not result in prohibited actions?

6. Did the Court create conflicts in the law by failing to consider that a covered employer is required, by the conditions set forth in the statute, to show that an employee individually and objectively poses a contagious "direct threat" before imposing the new qualification standards; which also invaded her medical privacy rights and informed consent, particularly given the allegations and evidence that COVID-19 is not a vaccine-preventable disease, Ms. Apuzza was never diagnosed with COVID-19, and makers of the treatment, marketed as a "vaccine", simply claim that the shots may lessen COVID-19 symptoms for the user but the makers do not claim, nor has it been shown, to prevent infection of others?

7. Did the Court abuse its discretion by refusing to properly analyze whether certain "COVID policy" medical treatments and medical tests qualify as non-job-related qualification standards which are prohibited for all employees not just those diagnosed with an actual disability?

8. Is the Court biased and abusing its discretion because the Court has adopted nearly the same discriminatory policies and practices which gave rise to the complaint? Details are outlined in the Statement of the Case below.

Whether the Court erred in its interpretation of ADA protections and COVID-19 medical treatment policies for employees