Whether permit conditions are exempt from review under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine when their intended purpose is not to mitigate adverse impacts of a proposed development but to provide unrelated public benefits

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Marin County imposed a $39,960 “affordable housing” fee as a condition of approving a permit to divide a residential lot, absent any finding that the fee was needed to mitigate adverse impacts of the proposed development. Alternatively, the property owner might have dedicated various non-possessory interests in the property, other land, or low-cost housing units off-site to satisfy the condition. The court below held that neither the fee nor its alternatives were subject to the doctrine, which requires land-use permit conditions to bear an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” to adverse public impacts of the proposed development. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013). The questions presented are: 1. Whether permit conditions are exempt from review under the doctrine when their intended purpose is not to mitigate adverse impacts of a proposed development but to provide unrelated public benefits? 2. Whether the doctrine applies to such permit conditions when imposed legislatively, as the high courts of Texas, Ohio, Maine, Illinois, New York and Washington and the First Circuit Court of Appeals hold; or whether that scrutiny is limited to administratively imposed conditions, as the high courts of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, and Maryland and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals hold? ii LIST OF ALL PARTIES Dartmond Cherk and the Cherk Family Trust are the petitioners herein and were the in the California state trial, appellate, and Supreme Court proceedings below. The County of Marin, California, is the respondent herein and was the respondent in the courts below.