Should a pro se litigant's First Proposed Heightened Amended Complaint be unfairly denied by courts based on not following Scheduling Order, undue delay, futility, employee's knowledge, etc. despite substantiating belief of following Order?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Based on the Supreme Court of the United States precedents: ; . Should a “pro se litigant’s” [or any litigant’s] First Proposed “Heightened” Amended Complaint with attachments be . unfairly denied by any courts of law through its ' discretionary privileges based on not following the Court’s ‘ Scheduling Order, undue delay, futility, employee’s knowledge of information available to employee before filing suit, etc.; in spite of court records substantiating that the “pro se litigant” did irrefutably believed he followed the trial court’s Scheduling Order; because the trial court ; approved of and did not object to the proposed deadline to amend complaint as designated within the “pro se” Plaintiffs, “Joint Preliminary Report?” : 2. Under the second and third frameworks of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and within Title VI, Title VII, §§ 1981 and 1985 claims: Does an employer’s “verbal articulation(s)” without providing any pulpable evidence or factual support [e.g.: warning notices, other remedial write-ups, snapshots, salary administration policy, etc.] be sufficient alone, in : validating pivotal segments of the employer’s rebuttal for its disciplinary adverse actions against an employee within a summary judgment motion; and, under the Constitutional Laws of the United States and Evidentiary Rules: Should any “litigant’s” (especially pro se) submitted documentary evidence [e.g.: business records, employer’s handbooks, policies, appraisals, memos, personnel files, routine practices, affidavits, etc.], be calculatingly eradicated by judicial discretion based on authentication, : manipulation, and/or one “possible” hearsay statement, : which then makes invalid a “litigant’s” substantial rights | and legal opportunities in establishing (by a preponderance of evidence) pretext, race and compensation discrimination, comparators, routine practices, and delayed retaliation claims under the “cat’s paw theory” of liability when opposing a summary judgment motion? > ii C