Whether the Nollan/Dolan doctrine applies to impact fees

QUESTION PRESENTED In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 619, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 186 L.Ed.2d 697 (2013), this Court clarified that the requirements of the Nollan/Dolan' doctrine apply to a government agency’s demand for property from a land-use permit applicant “even when the government denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.” This Court recognized that demands for money create the same risk that “the government may use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue.” 570 US. at 614. The dissent in Koontz criticized the majority, inter alia, for failing to clarify whether a distinction between “adjudicative” and “legislative” impact fees still exists. 570 U.S. at 628 (Kagen, J., dissenting). The question presented in this case is: Whether, after Koontz, the Nollan/Dolan doctrine applies generally to impact fees, i.e., whether after Koontz there is any distinction between “adjudicative” and “legislative” fees when a government agency demands money or property as a condition of issuing a ! Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 US. 874, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). ii QUESTION PRESENTED—Continued land use permit and the fee is not a uniform permitting fee but is based on the specific nature and impacts of the project. A potentially narrower question presented in this case is: Whether development impact fee statutes such as Washington’s (RCW 82.02.050 et seq.), which afford substantial discretion to local officials to determine the amount of the impact fee required for a particular permit, are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny under Koontz.