Whether the narrow Reeves exceptions apply to Rule 56 summary judgment identically as they do under Rule 50

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The basic tenet of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000), is that in an employment discrimination case, “a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves also eliminated the “pretext plus” standard formerly imposed on plaintiffs by circuit courts at the summary judgment stage. In dicta, the Reeves Court referenced the existence of two exceptions to the general rule that a prima facie case combined with pretext allows a factfinder to infer that discrimination occurred. The first exception is “if the record conclusively revealed some _ other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision”. Jd. at 148. The second exception is “if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue[,] and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” Id. But Reeves was a Rule 50 case. The Questions Presented in this case are twofold: 1. Do the exceptions in Reeves apply under Rule 56 identically as they do under Rule 50 when the Court prohibits judges from weighing evidence and determining credibility? 2. Whether imposing a burden on plaintiffs to show a “conflict in substantial evidence” on summary judgment is a _ disguised, impermissible “pretext plus” standard.